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Deception in the practice of law is 
the constant focus of ethical scholars. 
When lawyers act as negotiators, they are 
presented with unique dilemmas relating 
to the use of deception. The rules of 
ethical conduct in most jurisdictions do 
not adequately address these issues, and 
are generally unclear regarding the status
o J o o
of false statements made in negotiations. 
Moreover, ethics rules generally urge
' o J o
zealous representation, which can 
conflict with efforts towards honesty. 
Lawyers constantly deceive designated 
opponents using the concept of the 
adversary system to justify extreme 
partiality. This system, it is argued, allows 
and even demands that in pursuing the 
client's interests, the interests of others 
be disregarded. The obligation to
o o
represent zealously has been employed to 
justify acts ranging from allowing an) J o o o
opponent to believe incorrect 
information to deliberately making false 
assertions.
The philosopher Immanuel Kant 
stated that every lie is an offence to 
humanity. If we are people first and 
lawyers second, such notions cannot be 
ignored, despite their apparent absence 
in the rules of professional ethics.
The nature of negotiation provides 
abundant motivation and opportunity to 
justify deception. Lawyers extract 
material gain not only for their clients but 
also for themselves when they make a 
favourable deal. The negotiator's dual 
objectives of creating value for one side 
and denying it to the other create a 
dilemma: maximum opportunity to 
advance those goals is not often gained by
o o J
forthrightness. As importantly, accepted 
norms of negotiation may alter 
expectations of honesty which exist in 
other contexts.
RULES' LIMITATIONS
As examples of the inadequacy of the 
way in which formal rules address the 
ethical dilemmas of negotiation, we shall
o
discuss rules operating in three 
representative jurisdictions: England and 
Wales, the US and Jamaica.
Neither the English rules of conduct 
nor the Jamaican canons of ethics 
specifically address a solicitor's actions in 
negotiations. General English ethics 
rules, as well as the decisions of the 
disciplinary committees, emphasise 
honesty in all aspects of law practice. 
Jamaica's rules give general 
encouragement towards practising with 
honesty and integrity but also fail to 
address directly the issue of honesty in 
negotiation.
As Michael H Rubin points out in his 
article 'The Ethics of Negotiations: Are
o
There Any?' in the 1995 Los Angeles Law 
Review the predominant legal ethics rules 
in the US, the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, do refer explicitly to 
negotiation but do not address the 
demands of bargaining with the same 
specificity that they address the demands 
of litigation. The preamble states:
'As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result 
advantageous to the client but consistent with 
requirements oj honest dealing with others.'
The statement above provides little 
real guidance. Similarly, while the English 
and Jamaican rules place considerable 
general emphasis on honesty, and while 
decisions of the English Professional 
Purposes Committee and the Jamaican 
Disciplinary Committee suggest that 
truthfulness and disclosure are mandated 
in negotiations, the other bodies of ethics 
rules also leave attorneys with much 
discretion in navigating the ethics of 
dealmaking.
AMBIGUITIES
Lawyers in each jurisdiction are 
confronted with the difficulties of 
applying general rules of professional 
integrity to an idiosyncratic and morally 
ambiguous process. US model rule 4.1, 
for example, provides the following 
general guidance:
'In the course of representing a client a 
lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or 
law to a third person...'
In their Guide to the Prcfessional Conduct 
of Solicitors, the English Law Society 
provides rules with sections analogous to 
this rule 4.1, stating that a solicitor 
should not deceive his or her client in the 
course of representation, but neither 
should he or she deceive others in order 
to further the client's interests. The 
English rules generally manifest strict 
requirements for honesty between 
solicitors.
It would appear that these rules 
could apply directly to a lawyer's conduct 
during negotiations, in which lawyers 
often make statements which appear to 
be facts regarding their client's position. 
However categorizing a statement as one 
of 'fact' is a subjective decision. The 
comment to US rule 4. 1 recognizes this 
and consequently fashions an exception 
for negotiation:
o
'This Rule refers to statements of fact. 
Whether a particular statement should be 
regarded as one of fact can depend on the 
circumstances. Under generally accepted 
conventions in negotiation, certain types of 
statements are not taken as statements oj 
material fact.'
Interpreted broadly, this comment 
sanctions deception in negotiations. 
Interpreted narrowly, it invites difficult 
distinctions as to which circumstances 
produce which definitions of a 'fact'. The 
English have no such explicit exception 
for negotiation; but this may not prevent 
the familiar process of rationalizing 
deception by distinguishing statements 
unequivocally represented as fact from 
mere posturing, puffery, or opinion.
Jamaican attorneys are guided in 
such matters only by broad requirements. 
They are required to assist in maintaining 
the dignity and integrity of the profession 
by avoiding behaviour which would tend 
to discredit it. They must seek to obtain 
reasonable settlements when it is in the 
client's interests. Their canons require 
them to withdraw when a client has 
perpetrated and refused to rectify a 
fraud.
As with the other rules, the Jamaican
code expresses the expectation that 
attorneys not take part in blatant fraud, 
but does not appear to forbid zealously 
bargaining attorneys from bending the
o o J o
truth.
FACTS OR OTHERWISE?
There are strong incentives for 
categorizing some statements as 'non
O O
facts'. To quote an example posed by 
David Geronemus in his article 'Lies, 
Damn Lies and Unethical Lies: How to 
Negotiate Ethically and Effectively' 
(Business Law Today, May/June 1997), it 
arguably permits an attorney to say that 
his or her client will not sell for $50,000 
if the attorney feels the opposing side will 
go higher, even if the client has told the
O O '
lawyer that he or she will sell for 
$30,000.
In The Journal of Legal Ethics (1994), 
Elizabeth Loder Reed's article 'Moral 
Truthseeking and the Virtuous 
Negotiator,' demonstrates an argument 
which could be offered in further support 
of this type of misrepresentation: that the 
lawyer has no intent to deceive. This is 
because:
(1) in a given bargaining context the 
opposing lawyer will not expect 
certain statements to be truthful, and
(2) the one making such statements will 
not expect to be believed.
Moreover as one party is rarely able 
to discover whether the other party was 
telling the truth about the amount it 
would accept, one negotiator's honesty 
could give an unfair advantage to the 
other side if their negotiator is dishonest.
o
SENSE OF PROPRIETY
Other factors, however, intervene. In 
the English rules, unless he or she is 
specially requested, a solicitor does not 
have the responsibility of advising his or 
her client as to whether a sale for the 
particular amount is prudent. This rule 
implies that a solicitor should have little 
input as to what settlement his client 
should accept. Thus, if the client is 
willing to accept $30,000, not only 
should the solicitor not be able to hold 
out for a larger sum, but unless asked 
should not be able to advise whether 
$30,000 is a fair settlement.
In that context, a statement that 'my 
client won't accept less than $50,000' 
reports a fact which one would
reasonably expect to have been 
communicated to the lawyer before the 
negotiation. Thus, arguably, that lawyer 
should be considered as asserting facts, 
and it is disingenuous to categorize the 
statement as one of opinion or value.
Even where attorneys are 
conscientiously trying to do the right 
thing in making a deal, limiting the
o o ' o
requirement of honesty to facts presents 
practical problems. Deciding which 
representations are facts would be 
particularly daunting during a pressurized 
dialogue between impatient parties, and 
virtually impossible when, as in 
international negotiations, the parties 
have disparate attitudes about the nature 
and process of negotiation.
In addition to being impractical in 
some situations, an approach which 
classifies some statements as immune to 
the requirement of truth   such as the 
US Model Rules approach   is suspect at 
the level of basic morality. This overly 
facile sleight of hand avoids the basic 
moral necessity of justifying one's 
assertions. Whether making certain 
statements should be considered wrong
o
or whether they can be justified in a given 
context, moral accountability requires 
that one accept the burden of 
justification. It could further be argued 
that the spirit if not the letter of 
professional ethics rules requires no less.
The preceding discussions 
cumulatively suggest that negotiating 
lawyers need to develop an internal sense 
of propriety in making ethical decisions 
about negotiation. Too much reliance
o
upon the rules and formalistic 
interpretations thereof can be dangerous.
CONTEXT SPECIFICITY
While we are arguing that lawyers 
should develop an internal sense of 
propriety to fill in the gaps left by vague 
ethics rules and specious rationalizations, 
we concede this may be insufficient 
guidance in some negotiation contexts. 
Distinctive expectations, goals and 
communication styles of the parties do 
play a part in defining good faith and 
'truth'. This is most obvious in 
negotiations involving parties from 
different cultures.
The ability to observe (or evaluate) 
the basic ethical duties of truth-telling 
and good faith during an international
negotiation may depend on a high level of 
cultural sensitivity. Ethical lawyers must 
understand the relevant values and ideals 
of the people with whom they negotiate. 
They must be aware that negotiators 
from different countries may have 
remarkably different approaches to 
negotiation norms and practices.
In making ethical decisions, the goal 
of a negotiation must be considered. 
Some groups, such as Americans, work 
singlemindedly towards securing a 
contract. Others, such as the 
relationship-oriented Japanese or the 
Chinese, aim chiefly to establish a long- 
term business association. In a 
negotiation between such disparate 
cultures, factual truth may be less 
important than observing ritualistic 
traditions of behaviour between the 
parties.
An American negotiator might 
discover that an Asian negotiator deviated 
from a previous agreement and interpret 
this as an act of deception. The Asian 
party, believing that business 
relationships must be amenable to any 
significant change in business conditions, 
would view this differently.
The authority to approve 
negotiations will also be dictated by the 
cultural background of each party. In the 
West, this authority often is assumed to 
reside with one person. In contrast, in 
Asian countries, decision-making is most 
often vested in a team, and negotiations
' O
are steeped in ritual and mutual respect. 
An uninformed American would 
consider this behaviour to constitute 
unethical tactics for withholding 
information or delaying progress.
CONCLUSION
Once the lawyer applies the basic 
requirements of applicable local ethics 
rules and studies the individual nuances 
of a given negotiation, he or she may still 
be faced with difficult and complex 
issues. Resolving these will require 
observance of the following universal 
principle: in choosing the professionally 
responsible course of action, a 
negotiating lawyer must go beyond the 
formal rules of conduct and consider the 
demands of personal conscience and 
moral accountability. @
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